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Analysis of Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) within ASEAN+3 
Framework
M. Sigit Andhi Rahman1
Abstrak
Sektor finansial merupakan sektor kerjasama yang paling 
intensif di dalam ASEAN+3. Penandatangan Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) pada Mei 2000 dan kemudian diperluas 
melalui Chiang Mai Initiative multilateralization (CMIM) 
atau Common Fund Agreement pada bulan Mei 2009, 
menandakan sebuah babak baru dalam relasi antara 
negara-negara tersebut dan juga dalam perdebatan 
akademik mengenai multilateralisme dan regionalisme 
di wilayah Asia Timur. Makalah ini menganalisis CMI 
dalam konteks multilateralisme, bukan dengan cara 
membandingkan dengan Uni Eropa misalnya, akan 
tetapi dari segi prinsip-prinsip multilateralisme itu sendiri 
sebagaimana diformulasikan oleh John Gerard Ruggie. 
Kata kunci : Chiang Mai initiative, multilateralisme, regionalisme, ASEAN +3
Introduction
The ASEAN+3 framework (China, Japan, and the Republic of South Korea)2 
has broadened and deepened in many areas of cooperation (20 areas). It ranges 
from political cooperation and security to youth and women. Researchers 
have been debating whether ASEAN+3 can be considered as multilateralism
in East Asia or not (See Acharya 2008, Liu and Yan 2004, Mahbubani 2008, 
1  Master Program of IRIO RUG (International Relations & International Organizations), the 
Netherlands. He can be reached at emsigitar@yahoo.com
2  Although many discussion on whether East Asia Community should include Australia, 
New Zealand, and India as stated in the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, ASEAN+3 has 
being considered as the main vehicle for East Asian regional integration and carrying out 
many cooperative activities compare to EAS. 
 
 Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010, Hal. 101-118 
 © 2010 PSDR LIPI                                                                     ISSN 021-4534-555
M. Sigit Andhi Rahman10
see also the concept of soft institutionalization in Qin 2007). The signing of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000 and then its extension-Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) or Common Fund Agreement in May 
2009- has brought new discussion to the debate. CMI is one of cooperation 
within ASEAN+3 framework in term of finance and monetary.3 This paper 
wants to address the question: to what extent CMI within ASEAN+3 
framework can be considered as multilateralism in East Asia?
Several studies on East Asian multilateralism have tried to compare 
ASEAN+3 to European Union (EU) as a model for regional cooperation (See 
for example Baldwin 2003 and Stubbs 2002). But it is important to focus the 
discussion on the definition and criteria of multilateralism itself. It should not 
make conclusion only by comparing the CMI with the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF). Multilateralism has indeed existed in many 
different forms long before the formation of EU. 
ASEAN is considered different with EU in term of institutionalization 
process. ASEAN has characteristic of informal agreement, lack of binding 
rules and procedure in its process than to EU. ASEAN focuses on trust 
building and maintain good relations. Qin Yaqing called ASEAN style as soft 
institutionalization (Qin 2007). This different style does not imply that ASEAN 
is not multilateralism. John Gerard Ruggie defines multilateralism as the 
practice of coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance 
with certain principles (Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form 1993, 8). The “certain principles” are the key point that 
differentiates multilateralism with bilateralism. It is not differentiated by 
the number of states as Keohane described (Multilateralism:An Agenda for 
Research 1990, 755. Those principles of multilateralism are non-discriminatory, 
indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity.
The paper will examine whether CMI has those principles. Section 2 
after the introduction will present briefly the CMI. This will be followed by 
Section 3 which consists of 3 parts. Part 1 will examine the existence of non-
discriminatory principle, part 2 will examine the principle of indivisibility 
and part 3 will deal with the principle of diffuse reciprocity.  Section 4 is 
the conclusion that will answer whether CMThe importance of this study is 
also to understand the condition of peace in East Asia after the Cold War 
especially after Asian financial crisis. Mahbubani stated that Asian financial 
crisis was predicted as fuel of conflict between East Asian States (79). As in the 
early 1980, Ruggie argued that multilateralism was crucial to the stability of 
relations among states in the West after second World War. An extended 
period of cooperation and economic growth among states in Europe, US, 
3  Chiang Mai Initiative (CIM) which launched together Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
was signed after Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Japan and some of other Asian states are made possible by multilateral 
arrangement of Bretton woods (Griffiths 999, 97). If this study concludes 
that CMI is multilateralism, it will contribute to the previous studies on the 
role of APT in East Asia peace building.
This paper uses the constructivist approach of Ruggie. Ruggie gives 
strong critique to the realist approach who neglects the importance of 
institutionalization process in international relations. The interaction 
between states helps them to institutionalize certain rules of behavior and 
conducts. These rules later on guide them how to behave toward each other. 
International relations are not merely the struggle of power between states in 
the anarchical system. In this respect, Ruggie perspective is in line with the 
liberal institutionalist such as Goldstein and Keohane.
Despite of the agreement on institutionalization aspect of liberal 
institutionalist, Ruggie criticizes the nominal aspect of institutionalization 
from Keohane. As mentioned before, it is not the number of states who interact 
determine relations between states as multilateralism or bilateralism, but the 
existence of certain principles. Ruggie also criticizes Keohane in the neglect of 
ideational factor in the institutionalization processes. Keohane only focus in 
the mutual interest between states, while Ruggie stresses the importance of 
idea in transcending their national interest. The role of ideas in international 
relations will be presented in the discussion concerning diffuse-reciprocity 
principle.
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
In ASEAN+3 annual meeting in Chiang May, Thailand, May 2000, financial 
ministers of ASEAN+3 member states, agreed in principle to pool their hard 
currency resources. This multilateral currency swap arrangement was called 
as Chiang May Initiative (CMI). CMI was a response to the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis. 
There are three tracks of cooperation in the agreement: currency swap, 
surveillance and early warning system for future financial crisis, and exchange 
views among the ASEAN+3 members on reform needed to international 
financial structure (Stubbs 2002, 449-450). Currency swap is an agreement to 
exchange one currency for another and to reverse the transaction at a date in 
the future. It builds the expanded intra-ASEAN US$ 1 billion standby swap 
arrangement. Miyazawa Initiative put in place by Japan in the late 1998 to 
assist Asian countries. The surveillance and early warning system will be in 
form of exchange of information on short-term capital movements in East 
Asia. It will make governments aware of potential problems. The last track 
will become the basis for recommendation to international forums on the 
international financial structure reformation.
CMI in the first stage combined the previous ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
(ASA) and new Bilateral Swap Arrangement (BSA). The ASA started in 1977 
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which allowed ASEAN members to exchange local currency for US dollars on 
a short term basis to alleviate “temporary international liquidity problems.” 
BSA is a network of new bilateral  agreements consists of 30 agreements 
between the 3 States (Japan, China, South  Korea) and each 5 ASEAN members 
(Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore), plus agreements 
among the 3 states themselves.
Table . 
Bilateral swap agreement under Chiang Mai Initiative
CMI has become a framework for ASEAN+3 member states to make 
contract between themselves bilaterally. All arrangements generally swap US 
dollars for local currency. For instance, Japan and Thailand contracted swap 
agreement in certain amount of US dollar against Thailand Baht and so on. 
Only one exception which is Japan and China contracted in Yen-Renmimbi . If 
a state wants to withdraw a necessary amount of money from more than one 
source, the state must negotiate individually with each of the swap providing 
counterpart. 
This arrangement is being criticized because of its structural weaknesses 
in terms of transparency and efficiency in the operation. In order to address 
the crisis in the future, the swap arrangements must be readily available to 
                                                                                                                               
5
Table 1. 
Bilateral swap agreement under Chiang Mai Initiative 
  status                               Amount (billion of 
 Countries                                  as of July 2002   dollars)a Currency                                         
 Japan-South Korea signed July 4, 2001 2 Dollar-won 
 Japan-Thailand signed July 30, 2001 3 Dollar-Baht 
 Japan-Philippines signed August 27, 2001 3 Dollar-peso 
 Japan-Malaysia signed October 5, 2001 1 Dollar-ringgit 
 China-Thailand signed December 6, 2001 2 Dollar-baht 
 Japan-China signed March 28, 2002 3 Yen-renminbi 
 South Korea-China signed June 24, 2002 2 Dollar-renminbi 
        or dollar-won 
 South Korea-Thailand Announced, not signed 1 Dollar-baht 
        or dollar-won 
 South Korea-Malaysia expected 2002 [1] Dollar-ringgit 
        or dollar-won 
 South Korea-Philippines expected 2002  1 Dollar-peso 
        or dollar-won 
 Japan-Singapore in progress [3]                      Dollar-Singapore 
        dollar  
 China-Malaysia in progress [1] Dollar-ringgit
 China-Philippines in progress [1] Dollar-peso 
 Japan-Indonesia in progress [3] Dollar-rupiah 
     
 a. Brackets indicate provisional figures 
       Source: http://www.piie.com/publication/chapter_preview/345/3iie3381.pdf
 CMI has become a framework for ASEAN+3 member states to make contract between 
themselves bilaterally. All arrangements generally swap US dollars for local currency. For 
instance, Japan and Thailand contrac ed swap agreement in certain amount of US dollar 
against Thailand Baht and so on. Only one exception which is Japan and China contracted in 
Yen-Renmimbi . If a state wants to withdraw a necessary amount of money from more than 
one source, the state must negotiate individually with each of the swap providing 
counterpart.  
 This arrangement is being criticized bec use of its tructural weaknesses in terms f 
transparency and efficiency in the operation. In order to address the crisis in the future, the 
swap arrangements must be readily available to allow time disbursement. In order to meet 
such need, the CMI must be carried out under a multilateral operational framework (Asami 
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allow time disbursement. In order to meet such need, the CMI must be carried 
out under a multilateral operational framework (Asami 2005, 20).
The Multilateralization of CMI (CMIM) or Common Fund4 in February 
2009 has transformed a network of CMI bilateral currency swap arrangement 
between the members, valued $78 billion, into a single $120 billion pool of 
funds committed by the members. This was the second stage of CMI. Under 
this Common Fund Agreement, member states could swap their respective 
currencies with US dollars for an amount up to the participants contribution 
multiplied by respective purchasing multiplier as provided.
The arrangement was proposed to convert BSAs into single contract of 
common fund. This essentially replicates the model of reserve pooling of the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). This is meant to be legally 
binding and enforceable contract, which would give effective protection to 
participating members (Park 2009, 52).
4  Formerly called as Self-Managed Reserve Pooling Arrangement (SRPA) and then in Finance 
ministers of ASEAN+3 meeting in Phuket, Thailand on 22 February 2009 has acquired new 
name: Chiang May Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The informal name is common 
fund agreement. The informal name, common fund will be used through out the paper to 
avoid confusion. 
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Table 2.
CMIM (Common Fund) Contributions and Purchasing Multiples 
* Hong Kong - China’s purchasing is limited to IMF de-linked portion because Hong Kong - 
China is not a member of the IMF 
Financial contribution Purchasing Multiple 
USD (billion) (%)  
 China 38.40 
China  
(Excluding  Hong  Kong, 
China) 
34.20 
 32.00
28.50 0.5
Hong Kong, China 
 4.20 
3.50 2.5
Japan 38.40 32.00 0.5
Korea 19.20 16.00 1
Plus 3 96.00 80.00 -
Indonesia 4.77 3.97 2.5
Thailand 4.77 3.97 2.5
Malaysia 4.77 3.97 2.5
Singapore 4.77 3.97 2.5
Philippines 3.68 3.07 2.5
Vietnam  1.00  0.83  5
Cambodia 0.12 0.10 5
Myanmar 0.06 0.05 5
Brunei  0.03 0.02 5
Lao PDR 0.03 0.02 5
ASEAN 24.00 20.00 -
Total 120.00 100.00  -
Table 2. 
CMIM (Common Fund) Contributions and Purchasing Multiples
* Hong Kong - China’s purchasing is limited to IMF de-linked portion because 
Hong Kong - China is not a member of the IMF
Multilateralism Principle in CMI
The three generic principles of multilateralism-nondiscriminatory, 
indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity-within CMI will be analyzed through 
out this section. Those principles will be analyzed within the three tracks 
arrangement in CMI. Nondiscriminatory principle will be analyzed in 
currency swap track, indivisibility principle in surveillance mechanism track, 
and diffuse-reciprocity principle in the mechanism of view exchange on 
regional and international financial structure reformation track. 
Those three principles are actually difficult to be separated from one 
another. The same thing happened in term of the three tracks of CMI. Each 
tracks can be analyzed with all principles because they have all elements related 
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to all principles. This theoretical framework is built by focusing the principle 
which is dominant in each CMI tracks. Only additional remarks in certain 
small extent will be added to give us a clear view on the interconnectedness 
of all principles and all tracks.
. The Non-Discriminatory Principle in CMI   
In this part, the analysis of the nondiscriminatory principle in CMI will focus 
on the first track of CMI that is the currency swap arrangement track. This 
arrangement was dealing with the membership, contributions and also right 
of states within the CMI. It is the reason that nondiscriminatory principle is 
discussed in the currency swap track.
Nondiscriminatory principle means that states should carry out their 
treaty obligations without any contingencies or exceptions based on alliance, 
or on idiosyncrasies of the circumstances at a hand or on the degree to 
which national interests are perceived to be at stakes. The example of non-
discriminatory principle in economic realm is the obligation of every member 
of GATT (and then its successor, WTO) to extend to all members the status of 
most favored nation (MFN). In security realm, it is the requirement that states 
respond to aggression whenever and wherever it occurs whether or not any 
specific instance suit their individual likes and dislikes.
The Common Fund of CMI suits the nondiscriminatory principle of 
Multilateralism.  This has broadened the participation in regional financial 
facilities beyond the eight countries that presently have BSAs. It has included 
Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei in the process 
for the first time. 
Under this arrangement all member states of ASEAN+3 have to contribute 
to the currencies pool in certain amounts.  Japan, China and South Korea 
contribute 80 percent of the pooled funds. Five ASEAN nations, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines �� each contribute $4.77 
billion (3.97 percent). Vietnam pools $1 billion (0.83 percent), Cambodia $120 
million (0.1 percent), Myanmar $60 million (0.05 percent), Brunei and Lao 
PDR. $30 million (0.02 percent)  each (The Jakarta Post 2009, 1).
On the other hand, each of ASEAN+3 member states has the right to 
swap its currency for dollars according to the  agreement mentioned without 
having the obligation to undergo any bilateral negotiations as in BSAs 
agreement. There are differences in the amount of the states contribution 
but still it is under the same agreement without any exclusion. Japan, which 
contribute the most to this arrangement with $38.4 billion or 32 percent of the 
total funds, and gets a 0.5 purchasing multiple, can swap its yen up to $19.2 
billion. Indonesia, with $4.77 contribution, get purchasing multiple of 2.5, can 
swap rupiah up to $11.93 million.
But, it is not enough to conclude the existence of nondiscriminatory 
principle without discussing the principle in the light of national interest of 
states. One of important thing is to look the existence of dual-frameworks 
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in CMI and the closer look on its proportion of fund between multilateral 
arrangement  and bilateral arrangement.
CMI actually has not canceled out other bilateral swap arrangements 
done by each ASEAN+3 member states. CMI still consist of common fund and 
BSAs. For example, on one hand Indonesia can swap rupiah through common 
fund arrangement up to $11.93 million. On the other hand, Indonesia has also 
signed the bilateral swap agreement with China and also Japan. Indonesia has 
signed BSAs with Japan for bilateral currency swap up $16.39 billion in June 
2009 and signed the same arrangement with China in March 2010 amounting 
to $15 billion. This is much larger amount fund than provided by common 
fund (Ibid�)
The comparison of total amount of fund in CMI between common fund 
and BSAs framework   is $120 billion compared to $90 million. It can be said 
that CMI is still using the discriminatory and nondiscriminatory principle 
in its framework. The BSAs exclude 5 respective ASEAN states: Lao PDR, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei. Each BSAs agreement 
also excludes states other than the two states who involved in BSAs. 
Chart . 
ASAs and BSAs
The Agreement on the Swap Arrangement under the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(as of January 19, 2010)
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respective ASEAN states: Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei. Each 
BSAs agreement also excludes states other than the two states who involved in BSAs.  
Chart 1. 
ASAs and BSAs 
 CMI Common Fund was planned to become fully multilateral framework. Although it 
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CMI Common Fund was planned to become fully multilateral 
framework. Although it gives more structural benefit, ASEAN+3 member 
states prefer use BSAs in CMI. This can be explained due to the risk when 
there is a disagreement among ASEAN+3 member states in using the fund in 
CMI common fund collectively.  State pairs might retain the option to activate 
bilateral swaps in crisis. 
This is the reason why there was a long debate among ASEAN+3 
member states to include Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, 
and Brunei in CMI common fund arrangement. ASEAN+3 had difficulties 
to agree on how large of common fund extension. The difficulties largely 
correspond to differences in their size, economic development and structure, 
external trade and investment relations, and political institutions, among 
other factor (Henning 2009, 5). To include Burma/Myanmar is politically a 
problem for other ASEAN members.
Nondiscriminatory principle in its full manner (only use the CMI 
common fund) will risk ASEAN+3 member states to be trapped in long and 
complicated decision making process.  This will jeopardize their national 
interest in the face of financial crisis. Henning states that coexistence of 
common fund (nondiscriminatory) and BSAs (discriminatory) could facilitate 
agreement on joint decision making by reducing the risk that adopting a 
supermajority or unanimity decision rule that would block disbursements in 
crisis (6).
This is different with MFN which is pushed into practice through 
constant negotiations. CMI will unlikely retire all its BSAs arrangement in the 
future. CMI will unlikely expand its nondiscriminatory principle to its entire 
frameworks and practices.
2. Indivisibility Principle in CMI
This part of section 3 will focus on indivisibility principle of multilateralism in 
the second track of CMI, the surveillance mechanism. First it will discuss what 
is meant by indivisibility principle according to Ruggie and  then will discuss 
the formation of collectivity of ASEAN+3 member states in  the  historical 
process of CMI surveillance mechanism formation. This part will end by the 
analysis whether surveillance mechanism of CMI has provided indivisibility 
principle for ASEAN+3.
According to Ruggie the indivisibility can take many different forms, 
ranging from physical ties or railways lines that the collectivity choose to 
standardize across frontiers, all the way to the adoption by the states the 
premise that peace is indivisible (11). In the context of military cooperation, 
states are required to meet their commitments to all states in collective 
security agreement. Griffiths adds that for multilateral security regimes, this 
refers to the requirement that peace be regarded as indivisible for and by each 
signatory to the treaty (196). The indivisibility of Peace is a social construction 
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and not technical condition. Ruggies said that states behave as though that peace 
were indivisible, and thereby make it so (16).
NATO is the ideal type of indivisibility principle in which a subset of 
states organized a collective self defense scheme of indefinite duration, de 
jure against any potential aggressor though de facto against one. Nevertheless, 
internally the scheme was predicated on the indivisibility of threats to bring 
collectivity together with the requirement of an unconditional respond. 
Ruggie gives an example of the concert of Europe, which also exhibited 
elements of multilateral form. The concert version is characterized by the 
dominance of great powers; decisions are taken by informal negotiations and 
consensus, and no specification of the mechanism for implementing collective 
action. This is why concert also put in the collective security arrangement. A 
concert nevertheless is predicated on the notion of all against all. This is the 
indivisibility of peace among the member of concert and their nondiscretionary 
obligation to respond to acts of aggression (Ibid�).
In the context of CMI, it can be analyzed in the same way. Has it formed 
an indivisibility of financial relation among ASEAN+3 member states or not? 
Richard Stubbs stated that Asian Financial Crisis has become a major catalyst 
in institutionalizing the new arrangement (CMI). First, it added to the sense 
of common history that has emerged in the region. Secondly, it demonstrated 
the ineffectiveness of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ASEAN. 
Thirdly, a clear consensus has emerged in the region that the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in conjunction with the U.S government, initially 
misdiagnosed the problem and chose to impose a set solution that only served 
to exacerbate the situation (9).
Asian Financial Crisis happened due to the lack of coordination and 
collaboration between ASEAN+3 member states. Even not all ASEAN+3 
member states directly affected by it, nearly every  government felt its 
reverberations and had to deal with the fallout from the crisis(Ibid�). The crisis 
was very contagious. Asian Financial Crisis erupted in July 1997 when the 
Thai government was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime to 
adopt a flexible exchange rate, resulting in substantial depreciation of the Thai 
Baht. This crisis affected the depreciation of Indonesian rupiah and Korean 
won simultaneously. 
There is change in the thinking among both political and business 
leaders in Northeast Asia and a growing realization of the urgent need for 
the creation of formal regional mechanism to deal with any similar crisis in 
the future and to maintain the economic growth of the region (Chai 2001, 
11). China, Japan, and South Korea realized that they need to develop their 
institutional connections between them for a better cooperation in economic 
issues and also the need to increase investment and trade with ASEAN 
members. Richard Stubbs adds that the economic health of ASEAN members 
was very much of the the 3 states interest. And for many ASEAN members 
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the crisis underscored the benefits of establishing formal economic links to 
the more developed economies of Japan and South Korea and the dynamic 
market of China as a means of facing any possible future crisis (10).
The construction of CMI in the ASEAN+3 framework has built the sense 
of solidarity among ASEAN+3 member states in term of economic and trade 
especially in financial sector. And by the set up of common fund arrangement, 
it has marked new development in term of indivisibility principle of 
multilateralism. Surely, future problem on one member’s financial structure, 
will be a threat to all members.
It is important to analyze how the ASEAN+3 perceive and formalize 
their indivisibility. It means how they coordinate and collaborate their action 
with the same foundation to face the problems,  especially financial crisis. 
The second track of CMI, the surveillance system is the indicator of how they 
arrange the financial coordination and collaboration in a single unit, in an 
indivisible unit.
The surveillance system can be discussed into 3 its important parts. 
First, the ASEAN+3 launched a regional surveillance mechanism called the 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) in April 2002. This was planned 
to be the mechanism of providing information and analysis that would permit 
the identification of financial and economic vulnerabilities among members 
and provide a foundation for regionally defined conditionality in the event 
that CMI in term of BSAs and also common fund were called upon (Henning 
2009, 3).
ERPD was a compromise between China and Japan. In November of 
200, a Japanese Ministry of finance backed a proposal for surveillance facility 
at CMI which then rejected by China. China lead to a creation of a less formal 
mechanism, ERPD. In April 2005, participation in the ERPD process became 
a condition for release of funds from CMI. At the meeting in Bali, Indonesia 
in 2009, they agreed to establish an independent regional surveillance unit to 
monitor and analyze regional economies and support CMI decision making. 
As a start, there would be an advisory panel of experts to work closely with 
the Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN Secretariat. But despite such 
strengthening the ERPD is still incapable of providing the level of economic 
surveillance (Rathus 2009, 2).
Secondly, it concerned with policy adjustment and conditionality. This 
also one of problems that ASEAN+3 member states still do not agree. Policy 
conditionality of IMF at the previous financial crisis proved to be the most 
contentious and resented aspect. Still there are no strict regulations on how a 
member state has to adjust its policy when facing financial crisis.
The third is the governance body in a permanent secretariat. By setting 
up of common fund, CMI mechanism needs to operate within a permanent 
secretariat. Prior to multilateralization, the CMI process as a network of 
BSAs did not require a secretariat. It is unlikely that the option for the CMI 
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secretariat within the ASEAN secretariat, but it is unlikely that ASEAN can 
provide the technical elements required. In December 2008, they met and tried 
to locate the CMI secretariat, but there was no conclusion yet to be reached. It 
is an important decision, because it will affect the locus of regional economic 
cooperation more broadly (Ibid�).
The surveillance mechanism should identify economic vulnerabilities 
and desirable policy adjustments for the states under review. CMI still has 
problems concerning with its informal economic surveillance, unclear policy 
conditionality, and the question of the CMI secretariat location.
The problem in establishing CMI surveillance mechanism is due to 
the strong noninterference principle in the history of ASEAN particularly 
and the 3 states relations in general. The politically established principle of 
noninterference to other member’s affairs, peer pressure or policy coordination 
constitutes limitation to the effectiveness of the surveillance process of CMI 
(Asami,14). The discussion in Section 3.1 on currency swap, stated that 
ASEAN+3 member maintain BSAs outside common fund. BSAs relatively 
support the resentment of ASEAN+3 member states of the interference from 
other member states or regional institutions. It can be said that common 
fund is a form of indivisibility or solidarity and BSAs is form of flexibility. 
ASEAN+3 member states might well place a higher value on flexibility than 
on solidarity (Henning, 6).
ASEAN+3 also finally agreed that the decision making process within 
CMI should be made on the weighted-voting system, similar to IMF. Despite 
of any adjustments made, it is clear that China and Japan will together be 
able to approve, or block, any application of CMI. With this kind of decision 
making, if we use the collective security model mentioned above, CMI will 
likely to be a concert in term of financial arrangement in East Asia. It is due to 
the role of great (economic) powers, the informal negotiations and consensus-
based decisions, and the lack of clear formal rules in the arrangement.  
The indivisibility principle in CMI surveillance mechanism is still in 
process. In the case of the EU, a multilateral surveillance mechanism did not 
work until the early 1990s, although the origins of multilateral surveillance 
can be traced back to the 1970s.
3. Diffuse-Reciprocity Principle in CMI
The last principle of Multilateralism according to Ruggie is the diffuse-
reciprocity. It means that joint participation has to take place over an extended 
period of time. In diplomatic practice, reciprocity can be differentiated in 
to specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity. While the concept of specific 
reciprocity leads to simultaneous exchange or one with  strictly delimited 
sequence (simultaneity), diffuse-reciprocity provides mutual benefits 
sequentially (Bolewski 2007, 45).
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Through consistent of cooperation, states generally accepted standards 
of behaviour. These standards exert their own normative pressure on state 
action, contributing to the development of long-term obligations between states 
which stress cooperation. Thus, in a system of diffuse-reciprocity, according 
to Keohane states do not need to seek the intermediate benefit guaranteed by 
specific reciprocity, but act in the confidence that their cooperative actions 
will be repaid in the long run (Reciprocity in International Relations1986, 145).
The long-term participation and not single shot of interaction become the 
basis for, anticipation about the longer-run of the functioning of the collective. 
In other words, Griffits said that states extend what is sometimes called “the 
shadow of the future”. The interaction of states in multilateral setting also 
helps states to transform their sense of self-interest (196).
There is important point that we can use from discussion above. It can be 
said that in order to understand the diffuse-reciprocity principle in CMI, we 
should analyze two aspects in CMI: the accepted standard of behavior and the 
transformation of states in a sense of self-interest, especially in the   mechanism 
of exchange view on regional and financial structure reformation.
The standard of behavior can be found in the set of rules that govern 
states in CMI arrangement. It already discussed in first and second part of this 
section concerning the nondiscriminatory and indivisibility principles. The 
rules in CMI is far from developed and formalized. There are already rules 
concerning with the contribution of each state and also their rights, but still 
consensus is the most important decision making to determine whether some 
states has the right to activate the common fund in CMI and on what terms.
The rules of how states should behave both before and after the financial 
crisis are also not yet settled. The difficulties of surveillance mechanism to 
penetrate in domestic matters of each states is the main obstacle. The rules 
concerning what states should do in order to recover from crisis in term of 
policy adjustment is not yet agreed, due to the resentment of the member 
states. ASEAN+3 member states are not yet having total trust in the CMI 
mechanism, especially in term of its surveillance mechanism. It can be said 
that CMI is far from having the accepted standard of behaviour which is 
important aspect in diffuse reciprocity.
On the other hand, the BSAs of CMI has relatively well developed 
mechanism; for example, in the question of term. Beyond the first 20 percent 
of the swap, borrowers could originally activate on 90-day basis, renewable 
seven times, at increasing increment over Libor. The surveillance mechanism 
is based on the judgment of the lender. The policy adjustment also negotiated 
between the pair states involved in the BSAs. The lender will activate the BSA 
on the compensation that agreed by the borrower. The agreement of BSAs in 
CMI between the lender and the borrower can be considered more as specific 
reciprocity than diffuse reciprocity.
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Trust building in collective collaboration is not only built from 
formalized set of rules. It is also built from the interaction between members. 
The exchange view between ASEAN+3 member states on financial structure 
reformation through CMI third track is important to discuss. Has the exchange 
view between them has transformed their sense of self interest?
As discussed before, Asian Financial Crisis has brought new perspective 
in the mind of ASEAN+3 member states (see page. 7). Asian Financial Crisis 
actually was not only important as a material fact or factor. The most important 
thing is the ideational factor of Asian Financial Crisis. The same crisis can be 
seen as reason for protectionist policy or “behind its fortress policy”. Financial 
crisis also can be seen as reason for war. Yet, the opposite of those were chosen 
by ASEAN+3 member states. They prefer to think that they are in the same 
boat with common history. They chose to think that there is no reason for 
not cooperating. This is the ideational factor of the financial crisis according 
to Ruggie (What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge 1998). For comparison, British nuclear 
capabilities were a very different social fact (in term of ideational factor) for 
United States from Soviet nuclear capabilities [Wendt 1994, 384(6)].
There was a swift on how they perceived its own interest and other 
interest. In term of financial interest, the stability of others has becoming 
their interest. It is interesting to see the changes of view of the member 
states, especially China concerning cooperation. China has been known for 
its preference on bilateral ties than multilateral, but since 1990s, China has 
changed its view ranging from security issue to the most intensive regional 
meeting on financial and economic issues. (Kornberg & Faust 2005, 7).
Mahbubani stated that there are some progresses to note in regional role 
of China, especially its relation toward other East or East Asian Countries. 
When US and EU turn its back from East Asian countries after Cold War 
especially in time of financial crisis 997-998, China help those countries by 
refused to devalue its currency, maintaining a rate 8.3 renminbi to US$1. As 
it had done by 33 percent in 1994, that would have made China’s exports less 
costly and also undermined efforts by affected ASEAN countries to restore 
their economies. In addition, China gave economic assistance more than US$1 
billion to Indonesia and another US$1 billion to Thailand, the two countries 
most affected by the crisis (229). China has seen its interest laid in the stability 
of other states.
The success of CMI framework in putting 13 countries in regular 
meetings is important to note. This is especially due to the hostility relation 
between ASEAN+3 member states. The relation between Japan, China and 
South Korea can not be considered as in good relations.  They hardly talk 
to each other. There is mistrust, competition and deep misunderstanding 
between Japan and China. The number of Chinese people who have friendly 
feelings toward Japan has declined sharply since the end of 1980s; and same 
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thing happened in Japan.  Japan and China has most share in CMI common 
fund and this has forced them to cooperate. Japan and China has learned to 
cooperate within CMI framework ranging from the discussion of the amount 
of share from each state in Common Fund to surveillance mechanism issues. 
Japan and China has learned to put aside their rivalry and seen the financial 
stability of East Asia as their common interest.
It is also interesting to see the diverse ideological background and 
ideological rivalry between the ASEAN+3 member states.  There is division 
between the noncommunist ASEAN, South Korea and Japan and communist 
Indochina, China and North Korea. As Mahbubani said that the history also 
told us the hostile relation between those states and it can be traced back from 
the beginning of World War II or further, the invasion of Japan to Manchuria 
and then to China mainland latter on, Korean War, Japan colonization 
in Southeast Asia. During Cold War, China supported many communist 
movements in those countries to overthrow the regimes in South East Asia 
(Ibid�)
It is remarkable to see communist states such as China and Vietnam has 
joined in the CMI. It is also important to mention the contribution of small 
and poor states such as Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar in CMI arrangement. 
This can be explained by the interest of those states for recognition as an actor 
from others (Wendt, 2). Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar, and also Lao 
PDR have transformed its interest above and beyond the survival through 
brute force.
Although CMI lack of formalized set rules or standard behavior, the 
constant meeting between the ASEAN+3 member states has contribute on 
their view of their own interest and others. Qin Yaqing called this as soft 
institutionalization, which pays great attention to process maintenance and 
trust building, due to the lack formal institutions to sustain its consensus, 
and then contribute to difficulties in implementation of CMI decisions and 
important measures.
There have been constant discussions on the role of IMF in the respect 
of their interests. As stated in the CMI agreement that ASEAN+3 member 
states has common intention to contribute the reformation of international 
financial structure. It started with the common resentment to the IMF after 
Asian Financial Crisis. Richard Higgott said this as politics of resentment 
(Higgott 1998).
Related to the linkage to IMF, CMI in the first stage arranged that 
borrowers can draw up 20 percent of their swaps prior to agreeing on an IMF 
program, including required policy adjustment. Several borrowers would 
like to see this linkage reduced; the 13 member states were committed to 
reviewing the link periodically.
It is not important to go further detail on ASEAN+3’s proposals in 
CMI arrangement for IMF reformation. But it is important to see how the 
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member states perceived their financial interest in the context of regional 
and international financial structure. Certainly, there are always individual 
motive in their effort to reform the regional and international financial 
structure, but there are also many options to pursue state financial interest 
outside cooperation. Unilateralism is always possible. CMI with its third track 
of exchange views on financial structure reformation, has marked a new swift 
on how the ASEAN+3 member states pursue their own financial interest. This 
is the indicator of the existence of diffuse-reciprocity in the CMI.
Conclusion 
It is difficult to answer the question whether CMI in ASEAN+3 framework 
has suited the definition of Ruggie on multilateralism. The difficulties 
lay on the mixture of both multilateral and bilateral principles in CMI 
arrangement especially each of its tracks. The nondiscriminatory principle 
of multilateralism exists in the first track of CMI on currency swap. The 
involvement of all ASEAN+3 member states within the CMI common fund 
which was signed in the April 2009 after almost a decade of CMI process, 
is a clear indicator of nondiscriminatory principle. But by maintaining the 
BSAs outside common fund arrangement has put CMI in ambiguous position 
concerning this principle. BSAs mostly suited the discriminatory principle 
of bilateral framework. CMI has both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory 
principle in its framework and this will unlikely change in the future.
Asian Financial Crisis and then CMI as the respond of it, have built the 
collectivity and indivisibility among ASEAN+3 member states. Because of the 
lack of formal set of rules in governing in its surveillance mechanism track, 
consensus based decision making, CMI is best defined as a concert model of 
multilateralism in the respect of indivisibility principle. Japan and China as 
dominant states will likely determine the process and direction of CMI in the 
future.
The lack of rules mentioned is the reason to question the existence 
of diffuse-reciprocity principle in CMI. On the other hand, the constant 
discussions and exchange view between ASEAN+3 member states concerning 
reformation of regional and international financial structure have a certain 
feature of diffuse-reciprocity principle. From several facts, CMI has constituted 
an ideational factor that transform states sense of interest. There was a swift in 
the view of ASEAN+3 member states of their interest in wider perspective; in 
the relation of other states interests and in the relation with the regional and 
international financial structure.
If we link with findings above to the general question of whether bilateral 
relations are building block or stumbling block for a multilateral relation, 
BSA in CMI will be an obstacle or stumbling block for more solid multilateral 
relation between ASEAN+3 member states. When the process of multilateral 
arrangement needs member states to give up some of its national interest, 
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they will tend to avoid it and turn back to the BSAs. The existence of BSAs in 
CMI will prevent the ASEAN+3 from having a strong institutionalization.
The dominant role played by Japan and China actually can be seen 
positively as a potential to bring CMI or ASEAN+3 in general to become 
truly multilateral relations in East Asia. There were proofs of constant tension 
between states preference on noninterference (state sovereignty) and wider 
multilateral involvement, especially concerning surveillance mechanism. 
If Japan and China especially able to give examples to come out from that 
tension by giving up some of “their financial sovereignty” to strengthen the 
surveillance mechanism, CMI/ASEAN+3 will have more strong institution. 
Japan and China should take lead in the formation of set rules in it.
There is always price to pay for having strong multilateral framework. 
To build strong supranational institution, it needs certain aspect of national 
sovereignty to be sacrificed, but it does not to be a zero-sum; strong supranational 
institution or national sovereignty. In certain extent it is possible to have them 
both. The long process of ASEAN+3 has helped to build trust between its 
member states. This is the time that ASEAN+3 have to move forward. CMI 
as the most intensive cooperation in its framework can be its vehicle. BSAs in 
CMI can still exist for allowing temporary adjustment. But the most important 
thing to start with is to strengthen the surveillance mechanism system within 
CMI to become more strong, rule-based and independent. l
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